The Impact of Director Compensation on Operating Performance of Financial Holding Companies

[[abstract]]本文以我國金管會核准設立的16家金融控股公司為研究對象，研究期間2009年至2014年，並分兩階段進行實證分析，第一階段係採用資料包絡分析法評估我國金融控股公司的經營績效，第二階段則利用設限迴歸模型，對董事酬勞與公司經營績效的關係進行檢視，並進一步納入公司治理變數的影響。實證結果顯示，整體金控業處於規模報酬遞增的狀態，因未達最適規模的水準，其經營績效似仍有不少的改善空間。就整體期間來看，董事酬勞對經營績效多呈現顯著為負的影響，似隱含過量的董事酬勞導致經營績效不彰的結果。而在公司治理變數方面，以最終控制者個人持股比率對經營績效的正向影響，相對較董事持股比率和大股東持股比率明顯，惟獨立董事比率及法人持股比率，卻對經營績效無顯著影響，似代表監督機制並無法有效地發揮。[[abstract]]This paper studies 16 financial holding companies which the establishments are approved by the FSC in Taiwan as research samples during the period from 2009 to 2014 The empirical analysis is divided into 2 stages: The first stage is to use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to assess the financial holding company's operating performance; The second stage is to apply censored regression model to examine the relationship between director compensation and operating performance and to incorporate corporate governance variables into the model The empirical result shows that the overall financial holding industry exhibits increasing returns to scale Since it does not reach the optimal scale there are still opportunities for improvement in operating performance In general the director compensation displays a significantly negative effect on operating performance which seems to imply that the excessive director compensation will result in poor operating performance In terms of corporate governance variables the ratio of ultimate owner individual shareholding shows a greater positive effect on operating performance than directors' shareholding ratio and blockholders’ shareholding ratio While the ratio of independent directors and the ratio of institutional investors’ shareholding have no significant effect on operating performance which appears to indicate that the monitoring mechanism may not work effectivel