China and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Towards a more active norm-shaping role?

This paper considers two main questions. First, how has China engaged with R2P and influenced the concept’s normative trajectory? Second, is a distinct Chinese perspective and practice of R2P emerging? The paper advances two main arguments. First, a decade of official Chinese discourse reveals a large degree of continuity in terms of the perspectives expressed towards R2P. Most significantly, this indicates consistent support for R2P but clear efforts to frame the concept in a manner that aligns with China’s own normative preferences and interests. This has meant a strong emphasis on pillars I and II, while downplaying the potential for coercive, non-consensual action which could undermine the centrality of the state. The second main argument is that recent Chinese practice suggests a possible shift in strategy from norm resistance to a more proactive norm-shaping role in relation to R2P. Resistance – by blocking the implementation of coercive pillar III measures - remains an essential element of Beijing’s approach but there are signs that this is now being supplemented by more concerted Chinese efforts to entrench the consensual state-assistance components of R2P which Beijing supports. This is reflected in more visible engagement in normative discourse – via the RP concept’s conservative interpretation of the international community’s protection role - and more practically, in enhanced Chinese contributions to peace operations in Africa and diplomatic efforts to resolve protection crises