Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given the payoff-relevant parameters, existing results conclude that as individuals observe infinitely many signals, their beliefs about the parameters will eventually merge. We first show that these results are fragile when individuals are uncertain about the signal distributions: given any such model, vanishingly small individual uncertainty about the signal distributions can lead to substantial (nonvanishing) differences in asymptotic beliefs. Under a uniform convergence assumption, we then characterize the conditions under which a small amount of uncertainty leads to significant asymptotic disagreement
We study the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a model of learning over a general social network. Each...
Signals and cues are extensively used in social interactions across diverse communication systems. H...
Understanding information exchange and aggregation on networks is a central problem in theoretical e...
Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given the payo¤-...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state o...
Disagreement persists over issues that have objective truths. In the presence of increasing amounts ...
Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successe...
International audienceWhy do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own...
Bayesian learning is a rational and effective strategy in the opinion dynamic process. In this paper...
e study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives a ...
In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can ...
It is usually assumed that information cascades are most likely to occur when an early but incorrect...
In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can ...
We study the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a model of learning over a general social network. Each...
Signals and cues are extensively used in social interactions across diverse communication systems. H...
Understanding information exchange and aggregation on networks is a central problem in theoretical e...
Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given the payo¤-...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state o...
Disagreement persists over issues that have objective truths. In the presence of increasing amounts ...
Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successe...
International audienceWhy do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own...
Bayesian learning is a rational and effective strategy in the opinion dynamic process. In this paper...
e study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives a ...
In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can ...
It is usually assumed that information cascades are most likely to occur when an early but incorrect...
In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can ...
We study the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a model of learning over a general social network. Each...
Signals and cues are extensively used in social interactions across diverse communication systems. H...
Understanding information exchange and aggregation on networks is a central problem in theoretical e...