I consider a final-offer arbitration model in which the offers are submitted sequentially, the parties are allowed to accept offers, and the arbitrator maximizes Nash's social welfare function. I show that backwards induction in this three-period model leads to the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of Rubinstein's infinite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining game
We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players...
Many negotiations (for instance, among political parties or partners in a business) are characterize...
We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players...
We study bilateral bargaining á la Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) but where players face two s...
We study bilateral bargaining á la Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) but where players face two s...
We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot re...
We derive closed-form solutions for the Rubinstein alternating offers game for cases where the two p...
We derive closed-form solutions for the Rubinstein alternating offers game for cases where the two p...
I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equili...
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining ...
We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous offer bargaining game of incomplete infor...
In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries over on repeated ...
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that barg...
We present a fictitious-play model of bargaining, where two bargainers play the Nash demand game rep...
We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-o¤er bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each...
We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players...
Many negotiations (for instance, among political parties or partners in a business) are characterize...
We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players...
We study bilateral bargaining á la Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) but where players face two s...
We study bilateral bargaining á la Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) but where players face two s...
We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot re...
We derive closed-form solutions for the Rubinstein alternating offers game for cases where the two p...
We derive closed-form solutions for the Rubinstein alternating offers game for cases where the two p...
I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equili...
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining ...
We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous offer bargaining game of incomplete infor...
In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries over on repeated ...
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that barg...
We present a fictitious-play model of bargaining, where two bargainers play the Nash demand game rep...
We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-o¤er bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each...
We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players...
Many negotiations (for instance, among political parties or partners in a business) are characterize...
We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players...
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