Improving the resilience and cost-performance of internet routing

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the de facto protocol for coordinating Internet routing at the interdomain level, has limitations despite its tremendous success in maintaining network reachability with great scalability. First, the protocol has no mechanism to check the integrity of routing information, leaving the Internet routing system unprotected from prefix hijacking attacks. Second, although BGP is designed for policy-based routing, the protocol is not expressive enough to implement many complex routing policies. For Online Service Provider (OSP) networks, an important emerging type of networks in the Internet, this limitation presents challenges for the traffic engineering task, whose goal is to optimize traffic transport cost and user-perceived performance. This dissertation improves Internet routing on two aspects, resilience and cost-performance tradeoff. To improve the resilience of Internet routing, we propose a comprehensive set of defense solutions against prefix hijacking attacks, including an accurate, real-time, light-weight and readily deployable detection system and an automatic mitigation system. As an example of improving cost-performance of Internet routing, we study the interdomain traffic engineering problem in OSP networks, and present the design and prototype implementation of the first online traffic engineering system for OSPs