Two Kinds of Ontological Pluralism. Meinong and Ingarden

Meinong developed an argument to prove that we should admit a third mode of being beside existence and consistence. He soon became dissatisfied with this third way of being and replaced it by his infamous “outside being [Außersein] of the pure object”, a mode of objectuality according to which we can say that there objects which have no mode of being. I will first show that Meinong’s argument to reject its third kind of being is defective and can be avoided by adopting Ingarden’s kind of existential pluralism. I will then show that the adoption of the Ingardenian variety of existential pluralism contradicts the Meinongian variety on two important ontological points and that a conditional argument in favour of the first sort of existential pluralism may be formulated if a distinction between two kinds of intentional objects is introduced.