A two-level Probabilistic Risk Assessment of cascading outages

Cascading outages in power systems can lead to major power disruptions and blackouts and involve a large number of different mechanisms. The typical development of a cascading outage can be split in two phases with different dominant cascading mechanisms. As a power system is usually operated in N-1 security, an initiating contingency cannot entail a fast collapse of the grid. However, it can trigger a thermal transient, increasing significantly the likelihood of additional contingencies, in a 'slow cascade.' The loss of additional elements can then trigger an electrical instability. This is the origin of the subsequent 'fast cascade,' where a rapid succession of events can lead to a major power disruption. Several models of probabilistic simulations exist, but they tend to focus either on the slow cascade or on the fast cascade, according to mechanisms considered, and rarely on both. We propose in this paper a decomposition of the analysis in two levels, able to combine probabilistic simulations for the slow and the fast cascades. These two levels correspond to these two typical phases of a cascading outage. Models are developed for each of these phases. A simplification of the overall methodology is applied to two test systems to illustrate the concept.SCOPUS: ar.j