Thomistic Personalism: Clarifying and Advancing the Project

Personalism is a reaction against two equally serious errors in the moral and political realms: placing ultimate importance on autonomy and self-interest (individualism), and placing ultimate importance on the glory of the collective (collectivism). Seeking a third way between these errors, personalists argue that a philosophical anthropology must be the guiding light. And they also argue that three claims are central to an accurate philosophical anthropology: (i) persons possess an inalienable dignity; (ii) the telos of persons is communion or love; and (iii) some dimensions of persons are inexhaustibly mysterious. At its core, personalism demands that all intrapersonal, interpersonal, and institutional activity must respect these three truths. Following philosophers such as Jacques Maritain, St. Wojtyla/John Paul II, and Fr. W. Norris Clarke, S.J., I believe that personalism must be grounded in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus, my dissertation is an attempt to clarify and advance the project of Thomistic personalism. In order to clarify the project, I identify three species of Thomistic personalism. The first grounds the main commitments of personalism in the metaphysics and other relevant work of St. Thomas; the second adds to the first by arguing that phenomenology must be integrated into the project; and the third adds to the second by arguing that St. Thomass understanding of esse (i.e., the act of existing) must be completed creatively and placed at the heart of the project. With these species made clear, I advance the project in two main ways. First, I identify two norms which are internal to the project and show that both norms require the integration of phenomenology. Second, I acknowledge that Clarkes work on Thomistic personalism makes a compelling case for the primacy of esse, but I also note that his work has received some serious criticism. Thus, I modify and defend two fronts of Clarkes work: his claim that esse is thick and essence is thin, and his claim that receptivity is an ontological perfection. I conclude that Clarkes understanding of esse, with some alteration, remains highly plausible. Accordingly, the primacy of esse in Thomistic personalism is still a viable path