ArticleThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular influences in turn depends on the prospective destination of the agency head: elsewhere in the public sector; the private sector; or retirement. We estimate survival models of agency heads’ tenure using panel data on British central government executive agencies from 1989-2012. Our findings suggest that chief executives of poorly performing agencies are encouraged to retire sooner. We find no evidence of change in political control increasing risk of any form of exit, suggesting that political pressure to leave is not substanti...
In this article, using our original data on party leadership succession in 23 parliamentary democrac...
This Research Note explores the political dynamics of bureaucratic turnover. It argues that changes ...
Forced CEO exit has received limited attention as a unique form of CEO succession. Empirical work ra...
There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular inf...
PublishedArticleThis article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of pow...
The survival of governments ultimately depends on the survival of its components. These components a...
In many political systems the political neutrality of senior managers’ tenure is often cherished as ...
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from...
In October 2010, the UK’s Coalition Government announced a radical reduction in the number of public...
This article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of powers to parliamen...
We investigate the life span and risk of termination of 723 arm’s length agencies in the United King...
If presidents wish to see their policy priorities implemented, they need control over career executi...
This paper develops a theory to study the political economy of CEO longevity by examining how agreem...
publication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticleThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an articl...
Abstract. Government ministers in Parliamentary democracies are career politi-cians for whom public ...
In this article, using our original data on party leadership succession in 23 parliamentary democrac...
This Research Note explores the political dynamics of bureaucratic turnover. It argues that changes ...
Forced CEO exit has received limited attention as a unique form of CEO succession. Empirical work ra...
There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular inf...
PublishedArticleThis article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of pow...
The survival of governments ultimately depends on the survival of its components. These components a...
In many political systems the political neutrality of senior managers’ tenure is often cherished as ...
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from...
In October 2010, the UK’s Coalition Government announced a radical reduction in the number of public...
This article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of powers to parliamen...
We investigate the life span and risk of termination of 723 arm’s length agencies in the United King...
If presidents wish to see their policy priorities implemented, they need control over career executi...
This paper develops a theory to study the political economy of CEO longevity by examining how agreem...
publication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticleThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an articl...
Abstract. Government ministers in Parliamentary democracies are career politi-cians for whom public ...
In this article, using our original data on party leadership succession in 23 parliamentary democrac...
This Research Note explores the political dynamics of bureaucratic turnover. It argues that changes ...
Forced CEO exit has received limited attention as a unique form of CEO succession. Empirical work ra...