Sequential auctions in uncertain information settings.

This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncertainty of the bidders. Specifically, there are three key auction parameters that the bidders could be uncertain about: the valuations of the objects for sale, the number of objects for sale, and the number of participating bidders. We analyse the bidding behaviour for each of these three sources of uncertainty. For each setting, we first find the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that comprise a series. Then we analyze the effect of these uncertainties on the computational and economic properties of the equilibrium solution. The former analysis is essential if we want to use software agents to bid on our behalf. The latter is essential because both the auctioneer and the bidders want to know how these uncertainties affect their profits. Thus we compare the outcomes for these settings from the perspective of the bidders (i.e., in terms of their profits), from the perspective of the auctioneer (i.e., in terms of his revenue), and from a global perspective (i.e., in terms of auction efficiency). © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg