Police Interrogation and the Supreme Court--The Latest Round

My first task is to explain to some degree the nature of the problem embodied in our title. This book has been designated as Escobedo-The Second Round. What we will be discussing is a series of cases, decided in June, 1966, the most noteworthy of which is Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436 (1966)]. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a new set of standards governing the introduction in evidence of statements obtained from the defendant through police interrogation. Actually, to a degree these standards were not entirely new. They had been suggested, at least in part, in the Escobedo decision in June, 1964 [Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ( 1964 )]. In that respect the Miranda standards can properly be described as Escobedo-The Second Round. Really, however, the standards laid down go so far beyond those prescribed in Escobedo itself, that it is more accurate to describe this series of cases as Miranda-The First Round or, to be more accurate, Police Interrogation and the Supreme Court-The Latest Round