The Supreme Court of the United States reversed a prior holding and ruled that nonprice restrictions on competition among distributors are not a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In so doing, the Court placed significant reliance on the economic implications of the challenged marketing arrangement. The author explores the Court\u27s increased sensitivity to marketplace realities in its decision to return to a more flexible standard of gauging the illegality of vertical restriction schemes. The business planner is cautioned on possible antitrust pitfalls resulting from the newly engendered economic efficiency guidelines. In conclusion, the reinstatement of a reasonableness approach is welcomed
The debate concerning the appropriateness of existing antitrust standards for distribution (vertical...
The Supreme Court\u27s decision last term in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. demonstrat...
Cognizant of historical shifts in the methodology and standards applied in antitrust analysis, parti...
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed a prior holding and ruled that nonprice restrictions...
Section I of the Sherman Act condemns and declares illegal “every restraint, combination in form of ...
Over time, the Supreme Court has adopted a laissez faire attitude toward antitrust enforcement, whic...
The Supreme Court’s Leegin decision has now brought the rule of reason to all purely vertical intrab...
Vertical restrictions between franchisors and their dealers have long been a thorny problem in antit...
The United States Supreme Court, distinguishing between sales and agency transactions, has held that...
In this Article I present a two-pronged analysis of vertical restraints, one in law and one in econo...
Franchise agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor or retail dealer of the manufacturer\u...
Journal ArticleIn 1963, the Supreme Court held it did not know enough about the "economic and busine...
In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court acknowledged what a group of law and economics scholars had been ...
The application of section 1 of the Sherman Act to resale restrictions imposed by a supplier of good...
This case note provides an in depth discussion of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, In...
The debate concerning the appropriateness of existing antitrust standards for distribution (vertical...
The Supreme Court\u27s decision last term in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. demonstrat...
Cognizant of historical shifts in the methodology and standards applied in antitrust analysis, parti...
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed a prior holding and ruled that nonprice restrictions...
Section I of the Sherman Act condemns and declares illegal “every restraint, combination in form of ...
Over time, the Supreme Court has adopted a laissez faire attitude toward antitrust enforcement, whic...
The Supreme Court’s Leegin decision has now brought the rule of reason to all purely vertical intrab...
Vertical restrictions between franchisors and their dealers have long been a thorny problem in antit...
The United States Supreme Court, distinguishing between sales and agency transactions, has held that...
In this Article I present a two-pronged analysis of vertical restraints, one in law and one in econo...
Franchise agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor or retail dealer of the manufacturer\u...
Journal ArticleIn 1963, the Supreme Court held it did not know enough about the "economic and busine...
In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court acknowledged what a group of law and economics scholars had been ...
The application of section 1 of the Sherman Act to resale restrictions imposed by a supplier of good...
This case note provides an in depth discussion of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, In...
The debate concerning the appropriateness of existing antitrust standards for distribution (vertical...
The Supreme Court\u27s decision last term in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. demonstrat...
Cognizant of historical shifts in the methodology and standards applied in antitrust analysis, parti...