In 1991, Bryant and Eckard estimated the annual probability that a cartel would be detected by the US Federal authorities, conditional on being detected, to be at most between 13 % and 17 %. 15 years later, we estimated the same probability over a European sample and we found an annual probability that falls between 12.9 % and 13.3 %. We also develop a detection model to clarify this probability. Our estimate is based on detection durations, calculated from data reported for all the cartels convicted by the European Commission from 1969 to the present date, and a statistical birth and death process model describing the onset and detection of cartels
This paper investigates the deterrent impact of anti-cartel enforcement. It is shown theoretically t...
The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. Wha...
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge es...
<p>Abstract copyright data collection owner.</p>The dataset records firms that were involved in EU-w...
Estimates of average cartel duration and the annual probability of cartel death are based on data fo...
We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement pro...
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy on collusio...
The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discr...
This paper examines the effects of European Commission’s (EC) new leniency program on the EC’s capab...
Defence date: 03 October 2018Examining Board: Prof. David K. Levine, EUI (Supervisor); Prof. Giacomo...
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy on collusio...
In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the po...
In an effort to combat illegal cartel activities taking place in the European Union, in 1996 the Eur...
Abstract: This paper studies cartel deterrence and cartel stability. I use the cartel decision-makin...
The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major obje...
This paper investigates the deterrent impact of anti-cartel enforcement. It is shown theoretically t...
The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. Wha...
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge es...
<p>Abstract copyright data collection owner.</p>The dataset records firms that were involved in EU-w...
Estimates of average cartel duration and the annual probability of cartel death are based on data fo...
We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement pro...
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy on collusio...
The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discr...
This paper examines the effects of European Commission’s (EC) new leniency program on the EC’s capab...
Defence date: 03 October 2018Examining Board: Prof. David K. Levine, EUI (Supervisor); Prof. Giacomo...
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy on collusio...
In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the po...
In an effort to combat illegal cartel activities taking place in the European Union, in 1996 the Eur...
Abstract: This paper studies cartel deterrence and cartel stability. I use the cartel decision-makin...
The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major obje...
This paper investigates the deterrent impact of anti-cartel enforcement. It is shown theoretically t...
The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. Wha...
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge es...