Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis

This essay explains the WTO\u27s enforcement mechanism in terms of interest group theory. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, a WTO member that fails to comply with a ruling in a trade dispute is subject to retaliation from the complaining member: the complaining member may raise tariffs against the offending member\u27s products. This remedy creates incentives for exporters in the offending country to lobby their government in favor of compliance. As a result, the retaliation remedy promotes compliance without intruding directly on national institutions. It is thus superior to suggested reforms, like direct effect, that would commandeer courts or other national governmental bodies. The retaliation remedy resolves a dilemma at the heart of the world trade regime: how to give the WTO sufficient power to promote global trade without conferring so much power that the organization becomes a threat to sovereignty and representative government