Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts elicits truthful information and, in turn, enables people to make informed decisions. Thus, we analyze experimentally the conditions under which competition between experts induces the experts to make truthful statements and enables jurors listening to these statements to improve their decisions. Our results demonstrate that, contrary to game theoretic predictions and contrary to critics of our adversarial legal system, competition induces enough truth telling to allow jurors to improve their decisions. Then, when we impose additional institutions (such as penalties for lying or the threat of verification) on the competing experts, we observ...
“Blind expertise” has been proposed as an institutional solution to the problem of bias in expert wi...
This analogue, jury-simulation study consisted of two parts and examined some of the assumptions und...
The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter we study a com-munication game played by...
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts...
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts...
Many scholars lament the increasing complexity of jury trials and question whether the testimony of ...
The paper employs laboratory experimentation to study the effect of competition on truth telling and...
We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identifi...
International audienceDeparting from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed...
Chapter 1 studies the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions, the inquisitorial...
In this paper, we characterize adversarial decision-making as a choice between competing interpretat...
The history of the admissibility standard for expert testimony in American courtrooms reveals that t...
To investigate dual-process persuasion theories in the context of group decision making, we studied ...
The adversarial presentation of expert scientific evidence tends to obscure academic consensus. In t...
In this article, we characterize adversarial decision making as a choice between competing interpret...
“Blind expertise” has been proposed as an institutional solution to the problem of bias in expert wi...
This analogue, jury-simulation study consisted of two parts and examined some of the assumptions und...
The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter we study a com-munication game played by...
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts...
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts...
Many scholars lament the increasing complexity of jury trials and question whether the testimony of ...
The paper employs laboratory experimentation to study the effect of competition on truth telling and...
We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identifi...
International audienceDeparting from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed...
Chapter 1 studies the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions, the inquisitorial...
In this paper, we characterize adversarial decision-making as a choice between competing interpretat...
The history of the admissibility standard for expert testimony in American courtrooms reveals that t...
To investigate dual-process persuasion theories in the context of group decision making, we studied ...
The adversarial presentation of expert scientific evidence tends to obscure academic consensus. In t...
In this article, we characterize adversarial decision making as a choice between competing interpret...
“Blind expertise” has been proposed as an institutional solution to the problem of bias in expert wi...
This analogue, jury-simulation study consisted of two parts and examined some of the assumptions und...
The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter we study a com-munication game played by...