Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea\u27s Nuclear Facilities?

This Note examines the legal conflicts in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that developed due to the Agency\u27s attempt to verify North Korea\u27s compliance with the NPT. Part I reviews the history of the nonproliferation regime, as well as the pertinent textual provisions of the IAEA Statute, the NPT, and the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement. Part II reviews the events leading up to North Korea\u27s alleged withdrawal from the NPT and discusses the DPRK\u27s and the Agency\u27s legal arguments concerning North Korea\u27s rights under the regime. Part III argues that the Agency has the right to inspect the DPRK\u27s facilities because: (i) every law in the regime must be read in light of the other regime laws, and (ii) the regime as a whole mandates that an NPT signatory relinquish its sovereign rights as necessary to ensure global collective security. This Note concludes that delegates attending the upcoming 1995 NPT renewal conference should develop regime laws that: (i) regulate the Agency\u27s administration of intelligence received from third parties, and (ii) unify the regime\u27s emphasis on global rights to collective security over national rights of sovereignty