This symposium contribution advances two claims. First, a mistake (or ignorance) of fact should matter in the criminal law only insofar as it causes an actor to be ignorant of the law. Mistakes of fact should have exculpatory force if and only if they cause ignorance of the law, which ignorance ought to be an excuse to criminal liability. Second, an actor who should otherwise be excused because he is ignorant of the law, which ignorance is in turn the result of some mistake of fact, should not lose that excuse just because the underlying mistake of fact can in a plausible and legitimate sense be characterized as unreasonable
The chapter argues that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that fac...
The paper presents the institution of mistake (error) in our criminal law, focusing on its legal reg...
Despite the outpouring of interest in tort and criminal theory over the last thirty years, not much ...
This symposium contribution advances two claims. First, a mistake (or ignorance) of fact should matt...
This article makes six points. First, under any plausible normative perspective, the distinction bet...
The criminal law maxim ignorance of the law is no excuse represents a broad doctrine of strict lia...
Whether we understand it descriptively or normatively, the slogan that ignorance of the law is no ex...
After clarifying the distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law, this article explores...
Part I of this article discusses the principle that mistake or ignorance of the law is no excuse. It...
One of the main factors affecting criminal culpability is mens rea and one important element of mens...
Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable...
The adage ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ is significantly inaccurate. Ignorance and mistake of ...
In this chapter, I examine the forms of ignorance that defeat and sometimes create legal liability. ...
It\u27s axiomatic that ignorance of the law is no excuse. My aim in this essay is to examine what ...
This article examines specifically the mistake of fact defense and its disparate treatment under the...
The chapter argues that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that fac...
The paper presents the institution of mistake (error) in our criminal law, focusing on its legal reg...
Despite the outpouring of interest in tort and criminal theory over the last thirty years, not much ...
This symposium contribution advances two claims. First, a mistake (or ignorance) of fact should matt...
This article makes six points. First, under any plausible normative perspective, the distinction bet...
The criminal law maxim ignorance of the law is no excuse represents a broad doctrine of strict lia...
Whether we understand it descriptively or normatively, the slogan that ignorance of the law is no ex...
After clarifying the distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law, this article explores...
Part I of this article discusses the principle that mistake or ignorance of the law is no excuse. It...
One of the main factors affecting criminal culpability is mens rea and one important element of mens...
Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable...
The adage ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ is significantly inaccurate. Ignorance and mistake of ...
In this chapter, I examine the forms of ignorance that defeat and sometimes create legal liability. ...
It\u27s axiomatic that ignorance of the law is no excuse. My aim in this essay is to examine what ...
This article examines specifically the mistake of fact defense and its disparate treatment under the...
The chapter argues that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that fac...
The paper presents the institution of mistake (error) in our criminal law, focusing on its legal reg...
Despite the outpouring of interest in tort and criminal theory over the last thirty years, not much ...