Collective Rights in Artisanal Fisheries and the Trade-Offs in Fisheries Policies: An Analysis of Distributive Policies

This research analyzes the effects that a redistributive fishing quota policy, within a collective rights quota assignment system, might have on the profits and employment of artisanal fisher organizations. The Chilean authorities have been pursuing a deliberate quota redistributive policy between ship-owners of different vessel categories. This policy has affected income distribution between organizations. We use this experience to study the impact of distributive policies in artisanal fisheries. We use a multi-objective programming model and apply it to the common sardine and anchovies fisheries in the Biobío Region in Chile. The results indicate the presence of trade-offs between the equity–profits and equity–employment objectives. However, the scope for effective redistributive policies seems limited if the artisanal organizations consume their assigned quotas entirely. Moreover, the results suggest the existence of widespread inefficiencies in the effort allocation within the organizations, independently of the weight given to the different objectives