Missed Opportunity for a Golden Handshake? Why Did So Many Fishers Stay After the Introduction of ITQs?

presentationIndividual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been used in several countries worldwide to regulate access to marine fisheries. While ITQs can improve the economic efficiency of fisheries, in practice their application rarely has the expected effects. In this study we compare the output predicted by an individual based model of quota market with what really happened in the Tasmania rock lobster fishery since the introduction of ITQs in the fishery. When ITQs were introduced, some vessels left the fishery but it appears from the simulations that the fishery retained some over-capacity.\ud \ud \ud \ud The model assumes a profit driven behaviour where fishers will fish only if their expected profit from fishing is higher than the price of quota and fishers who are more profitable will continue fishing until they reached a maximum effort. The difference between the simulated and observed fishing distribution within the fleet can be explained by several factors not accounted for in the model, some impact the expected profit (e.g. perfect knowledge of all fishing areas) and others can be social drivers that where not taken into account (e.g. time to spend with the family). The importance of the societal factors in the decisions of should be further investigated