Essays on search and matching equilibria

This dissertation considers three separate applications of the theory of search and matching equilibria. The first chapter considers a partnership formation game, where agents on two sides of a market need to find a partner before a deadline, and search frictions make it difficult to find an acceptable partner. I characterize agents acceptance decisions – those with whom they would be willing to match – show existence, and provide a condition for uniqueness of equilibrium. This study provides a step towards a better understanding of matching behavior in non-stationary environments where agents have persistent type. The second chapter in this dissertation considers the import of adverse selection in a modern model of directed search in labor markets. Competition in this market drives firms to offer contracts that increase over time, limiting turnover. Adverse selection does not perturb contracts for less attractive types, but leads more attractive workers to accept initially low wages that grow faster than they would under full information. The final chapter of this dissertation explores the import of sequential search behavior in a model of equilibrium price setting by multi-product firms. On the one hand, the market produces results which affirm the common empirical focus on marginal distributions of individual goods’ prices across firms. On the other, when some firms do not offer every good, search behavior leads to interesting pricing patterns which would not occur in single-product markets