Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. Most importantly, we find that first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment
We examine behavior in a three-player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second ...
Author entered 'Experimental Examination of Behavior in a Sequential versus Simultaneous Trust Game'...
Item does not contain fulltextRecent efforts to understand the mechanisms underlying human cooperati...
Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the ...
Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the ...
We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games wit...
Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions mat...
We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of...
In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracti...
In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracti...
We studied the emergence of trust in a social dilemma game in four different communication situation...
In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracti...
We investigate whether a social norm communication can be used to nudge decision makers towards incr...
Berg et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122–142, 1995) study trust and reciprocity in an i...
The paper reports on experiments designed to determine the effect of the source of information about...
We examine behavior in a three-player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second ...
Author entered 'Experimental Examination of Behavior in a Sequential versus Simultaneous Trust Game'...
Item does not contain fulltextRecent efforts to understand the mechanisms underlying human cooperati...
Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the ...
Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the ...
We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games wit...
Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions mat...
We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of...
In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracti...
In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracti...
We studied the emergence of trust in a social dilemma game in four different communication situation...
In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracti...
We investigate whether a social norm communication can be used to nudge decision makers towards incr...
Berg et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122–142, 1995) study trust and reciprocity in an i...
The paper reports on experiments designed to determine the effect of the source of information about...
We examine behavior in a three-player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second ...
Author entered 'Experimental Examination of Behavior in a Sequential versus Simultaneous Trust Game'...
Item does not contain fulltextRecent efforts to understand the mechanisms underlying human cooperati...