Reasoning through emotion: An explication and test of a cognitive-functional model for the effects of discrete negative emotions on information processing, attitude change, and recall

Drawing from cognitive response persuasion theories, functional emotion theories, and theoretical and empirical work on the influence of message-relevant and message-irrelevant affect on attitudes, this dissertation presents a cognitive-functional model of persuasion (CFM) designed to broaden the limited theorizing available on the persuasive effects of emotions. In general, the CFM suggests that discrete negative emotions influence attitudes through a process driven by three initial responses: motivated attention, motivated processing, and expectation of reassurance. To test the model, a 3 (Emotion Type: fear, anger, or none) x 2 (Expectation of Message Reassurance: certain or uncertain) between subjects x 2 (Story topic: domestic terrorism and juvenile crime) within subjects full-factorial experiment was conducted. 236 undergraduates read fictitious news stories designed to evoke either anger or fear about domestic terrorism and juvenile crime along with persuasive news stories on those topics. Emotional arousal was measured after each emotion story, and thought-listing, attitude, message evaluation, and information recall measures were taken after each persuasive story. The study concluded with an information recognition and reaction time task. Follow-up recall and attitude measures were obtained two weeks later. The domestic terrorism results offered some promising support for the model. Most notable, fear and anger prompted different levels of persuasion in directions consistent with hypotheses as did the two levels of certainty in expectation of message reassurance. The juvenile crime results were less encouraging. The effects of fear and anger on attitudes were inconsistent with hypotheses, and certainty in expectation of message reassurance was not influential. The contradictions between the two topics\u27 results are explained by differences in message topic familiarity. In response to these and other findings, a revised version of the CFM is presented. In sum, the CFM attempts to bridge the theoretical gap between emotional and rational approaches to persuasion. This research offers evidence that discrete negative emotions can lead to different persuasive outcomes and that motivated attention, motivated processing, expectation of message reassurance, and issue familiarity can be influential in that process. The notion that emotions act as frames for new stories and its implications for information processing and recall is also discussed