Add to ORKGUniversity of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. May 2016. Major: Philosophy. Advisors: Sarah Holtman, Roy Cook. 1 computer file (PDF); iii, 201 pages.I begin by arguing against “ought” implies “can.” Without obligations limited by ability, I develop an account of the obligation to refrain from harm that shows most of our daily actions contribute to the harm of others worldwide, necessitating that we take possible alternatives to those harmful actions. While we can act on each individual obligation, together they create massive moral dilemmas, i.e. most of us cannot act on all of our obligations. In light of the impossible obligations, I argue that each person should develop a moral disposition to act on her obligations in order to achieve mor...
In \u27The Sources of Normativity\u27, Christine Korsgaard argues, a la Kant, that we must value the...
In this dissertation I argue that philosophical theorizing about moral responsibility has not paid s...
It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we ...
textThe dissertation is an examination of obligation, which I argue is a mode of rational necessity ...
The dominant accounts of moral obligation today take as their main task the derivation of duties tha...
What should we do when we won't do as we ought? Suppose it ought to be that the procrastinating prof...
Many have argued we have a moral obligation to assist others in need, but given the scope of global ...
We can often achieve together what we could not have achieved on our own. Many times these...
This dissertation is about legal and moral obligation. In response to the skeptic who questions a) w...
This dissertation defends Deontic Pragmatism -- the view that the normativity of obligations is grou...
The central problem of moral philosophy is to reconcile the universality of morals with the fact tha...
In this paper, I argue that we have good reasons to posit objective moral obligations, but we lack g...
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appe...
The thesis argues that, were there any moral obligations, they would be categorical; but there are n...
AbstractMoral Obligation, Mutual Recognition, and Our Reasons to be MoralbyNicholas I. FrenchDoctor ...
In \u27The Sources of Normativity\u27, Christine Korsgaard argues, a la Kant, that we must value the...
In this dissertation I argue that philosophical theorizing about moral responsibility has not paid s...
It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we ...
textThe dissertation is an examination of obligation, which I argue is a mode of rational necessity ...
The dominant accounts of moral obligation today take as their main task the derivation of duties tha...
What should we do when we won't do as we ought? Suppose it ought to be that the procrastinating prof...
Many have argued we have a moral obligation to assist others in need, but given the scope of global ...
We can often achieve together what we could not have achieved on our own. Many times these...
This dissertation is about legal and moral obligation. In response to the skeptic who questions a) w...
This dissertation defends Deontic Pragmatism -- the view that the normativity of obligations is grou...
The central problem of moral philosophy is to reconcile the universality of morals with the fact tha...
In this paper, I argue that we have good reasons to posit objective moral obligations, but we lack g...
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appe...
The thesis argues that, were there any moral obligations, they would be categorical; but there are n...
AbstractMoral Obligation, Mutual Recognition, and Our Reasons to be MoralbyNicholas I. FrenchDoctor ...
In \u27The Sources of Normativity\u27, Christine Korsgaard argues, a la Kant, that we must value the...
In this dissertation I argue that philosophical theorizing about moral responsibility has not paid s...
It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we ...