Add to ORKGA broad class of 2-person threat games for which a unique pure strategy Nash bargaining solution exists is characterized in terms of three, simple, empirically meaningful restrictions on the joint objective function: compact domain, continuity, and "corner concavity." Connectedness [in particular, convexity] of the strategy and payoff sets is not required. In addition, conditions are given for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium threat solution. Connectedness of the strategy and payoff sets is again not required
We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and conv...
Many economic problems can be modeled as n-person non-zero sum games. In such situations, there are ...
For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose ...
The novelty of the approach presented below is that each person in a conflict (player) seeks not onl...
Abstract. We show that games with compact and convex strategy sets have pure strategy Nash equilibri...
The literature results about existence of Nash equilibria in continuous potential games [15] exploit...
This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation be...
We study aggregative games in which players ’ strategy sets are convex intervals of the real line an...
This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions for finite normal form games under the assu...
AbstractIn this work, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-st...
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous...
We present a characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution on a domain which is not closed under ...
The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of $n$-p...
Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of...
[[abstract]]A pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem is extended to include games with non-expe...
We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and conv...
Many economic problems can be modeled as n-person non-zero sum games. In such situations, there are ...
For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose ...
The novelty of the approach presented below is that each person in a conflict (player) seeks not onl...
Abstract. We show that games with compact and convex strategy sets have pure strategy Nash equilibri...
The literature results about existence of Nash equilibria in continuous potential games [15] exploit...
This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation be...
We study aggregative games in which players ’ strategy sets are convex intervals of the real line an...
This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions for finite normal form games under the assu...
AbstractIn this work, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-st...
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous...
We present a characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution on a domain which is not closed under ...
The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of $n$-p...
Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of...
[[abstract]]A pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem is extended to include games with non-expe...
We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and conv...
Many economic problems can be modeled as n-person non-zero sum games. In such situations, there are ...
For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose ...