In a market where insurers are not allowed to risk rate, we find evidence of advantageous selection using observed health expenditure risk. Selection is driven by income and optimism about the future. This may explain insurers' profitability, despite community rating. © 2012 Elsevier B.V
Background: The risk compensation scheme (RCS) in the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) was implement...
A basic prediction of theoretical models of insurance is that if consumers have private information ...
Government intervention in insurance markets is ubiquitous and the theoretical basis for such interv...
textabstractIf consumers have a choice of health plan, risk selection is often a serious problem (e....
The health insurance industry is faced with risk selection issues affecting insurers’ sustainability...
If consumers have a choice of health plan, risk selection is often a serious problem (e.g., as in Ge...
We provide strong evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market, and analyze it...
We provide strong evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market, and analyze it...
We provide evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap in-surance market and analyze its sourc...
This article analyzes selection incentives for insurers in the Dutch basic health insurance market,...
Separating selection bias from moral hazard in private health insurance (PHI) markets has been a cha...
We use the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey in conjunctions with the 2002 National Health ...
This dissertation addresses the issues of adverse selection in the health insurance market. The lite...
The theory of adverse selection in insurance markets has been enormously in-fluential among scholars...
This dissertation addresses the issues of adverse selection in the health insurance market. The lite...
Background: The risk compensation scheme (RCS) in the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) was implement...
A basic prediction of theoretical models of insurance is that if consumers have private information ...
Government intervention in insurance markets is ubiquitous and the theoretical basis for such interv...
textabstractIf consumers have a choice of health plan, risk selection is often a serious problem (e....
The health insurance industry is faced with risk selection issues affecting insurers’ sustainability...
If consumers have a choice of health plan, risk selection is often a serious problem (e.g., as in Ge...
We provide strong evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market, and analyze it...
We provide strong evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market, and analyze it...
We provide evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap in-surance market and analyze its sourc...
This article analyzes selection incentives for insurers in the Dutch basic health insurance market,...
Separating selection bias from moral hazard in private health insurance (PHI) markets has been a cha...
We use the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey in conjunctions with the 2002 National Health ...
This dissertation addresses the issues of adverse selection in the health insurance market. The lite...
The theory of adverse selection in insurance markets has been enormously in-fluential among scholars...
This dissertation addresses the issues of adverse selection in the health insurance market. The lite...
Background: The risk compensation scheme (RCS) in the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) was implement...
A basic prediction of theoretical models of insurance is that if consumers have private information ...
Government intervention in insurance markets is ubiquitous and the theoretical basis for such interv...