Add to ORKGIntentionalism about consciousness is the view that consciousness is a form of intentionality or mental representation. A popular form of intentionalism says that the conscious or phenomenal character of a state of mind is determined by its intentional content. I argue against this form of intentionalism, and in favour of what David Chalmers calls ‘impure’ intentionalism: the view that the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by its entire intentional nature. NB This version should replace an earlier version of this paper which was on my old website.Articl
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of t...
Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of t...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomen...
Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomen...
Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomen...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of t...
Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of t...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object ...
Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomen...
Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomen...
Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomen...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This pap...
Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of t...
Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of t...