Strategic Sovereignty: Essays on Goods Provision, Conflict, and Governance in Regions of Natural Resource Extraction.

Why do some natural resource extractive projects experience local resistance and others do not? Why does a government vary in its response to this resistance? I explore the strategic interaction among a firm, government, and local population in order to explain variation in the following local governance outcomes: goods provision, protest, and government repression in regions of natural resource extraction. I argue that the extent and nature of government engagement reflects perceived tradeoffs between revenue and political support specific to the region. In doing so, I advance our understanding of the effect of non-state actors on governance outcomes in regions of limited state presence. I introduce a formal model of firm, local community, and government interaction to develop the strategic logic underpinning the different outcomes in regions of natural resource extractive regions. I then conduct a comparative case study of coal extractive sites in Mozambique, and copper extractive sites in Zambia and DRC, which provides a plausible account of the mechanisms proposed in the formal model. Finally, I develop a dataset and find empirical support for the hypotheses derived from the formal mode and which are elucidated in the comparative case study.PhDPolitical ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/110382/1/jesstein_1.pd