The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues

Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action cannot be determined. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the philosophy of concepts casts doubt on whether such a consensual theory will be found. Second, I propose a new, defl ationary interpretation of these experimental fi ndings, the trade-off hypothesis , and I present several new experimental fi ndings that support this interpretation