Add to ORKGWe study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumptions that (i) the bidders’ values are correlated and (ii) the seller needs to incur search costs when contacting prospective bidders. We show that although in general, the seller cannot fully extract the social surplus as in the case without search costs, it is nontheless possible to construct a search mechanism that will fully extract the surplus with an arbitrarily high probabilit
<p>Cremer and McLean 1985 shows that if buyers valuations are suciently correlated, there is a mecha...
Sponsored search auctions sell ad positions (impressions) to advertisers on the event of a user quer...
This paper investigates search techniques for multi-agent settings in which the most suitable agent,...
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumptions that (i) the bid...
This article studies a seller's compound search for bidders by a deadline. We show that the optimal ...
179 pagesAlgorithmic mechanism design is an interdisciplinary field, concerned with the design of al...
Sponsored search auctions have attracted much research attention in recent years and different equil...
The seminal work of Myerson (Mathematics of OR ’81) characterizes incentive-compatible single-item a...
In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a m...
A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depen...
Crémer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers ’ valuations are drawn from a correlated distri-b...
This paper considers auction environments with a (possibly correlated) common prior over bidders' va...
In this paper, we rst describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mec...
We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (...
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for “sponsored-link ” positions on a search eng...
<p>Cremer and McLean 1985 shows that if buyers valuations are suciently correlated, there is a mecha...
Sponsored search auctions sell ad positions (impressions) to advertisers on the event of a user quer...
This paper investigates search techniques for multi-agent settings in which the most suitable agent,...
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumptions that (i) the bid...
This article studies a seller's compound search for bidders by a deadline. We show that the optimal ...
179 pagesAlgorithmic mechanism design is an interdisciplinary field, concerned with the design of al...
Sponsored search auctions have attracted much research attention in recent years and different equil...
The seminal work of Myerson (Mathematics of OR ’81) characterizes incentive-compatible single-item a...
In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a m...
A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depen...
Crémer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers ’ valuations are drawn from a correlated distri-b...
This paper considers auction environments with a (possibly correlated) common prior over bidders' va...
In this paper, we rst describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mec...
We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (...
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for “sponsored-link ” positions on a search eng...
<p>Cremer and McLean 1985 shows that if buyers valuations are suciently correlated, there is a mecha...
Sponsored search auctions sell ad positions (impressions) to advertisers on the event of a user quer...
This paper investigates search techniques for multi-agent settings in which the most suitable agent,...