This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games whose core is equal to the core of the combined game. On the other hand, for non balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non balanced games which, combined with any other non balanced game, has an empty core.Cet article analyse le coeur de jeux combinés, obtenus en additionnant deux jeux sous forme de fonction caractéristique. Nous montrons que l'ensemble des jeux à utilité transférable peut être partitionné en cla...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends on...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is show...
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is show...
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is show...
J. Abdou, J.-M. Bonnisseau (dir.), G. Carlier (rapp.), B. Cornet, M. Florenzano, J.-J. Herings (rapp...
We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is...
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N ...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
La version attaché à cette notice est la version soumise à publication.We prove the non-emptiness of...
Let N be a finite set of players and let ρ be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and ...
We study solution concepts for NTU games, where the cooperation (or negotiation) of the players can ...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by ...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends on...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is show...
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is show...
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is show...
J. Abdou, J.-M. Bonnisseau (dir.), G. Carlier (rapp.), B. Cornet, M. Florenzano, J.-J. Herings (rapp...
We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is...
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N ...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
La version attaché à cette notice est la version soumise à publication.We prove the non-emptiness of...
Let N be a finite set of players and let ρ be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and ...
We study solution concepts for NTU games, where the cooperation (or negotiation) of the players can ...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by ...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends on...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...