Add to ORKGIn partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.REcursive Core, Nash Equilibrium, Partition Function Form Games
International audienceIn cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its p...
A large literature of cooperative game theory is based on the assumptions that the game is expressed...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where ...
We argue that a new solution concept by Huang and Sjöström (2002), called the r-core, extends the co...
We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form...
We consider partition function games and introduce new defini-tions of the core that include the eff...
Abstract. We consider partition function games and introduce new defini-tions of the core that inclu...
We generalise the coalition structure core to games in partition function form. In our definition we...
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N ...
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition struct...
We study solution concepts for NTU games, where the cooperation (or negotiation) of the players can ...
The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhi...
This paper introduces a core concept, called the γ-core, in the primitive framework of a strategic g...
A solution concept for cooperative games, the extended core, is introduced. This concept is always n...
International audienceIn cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its p...
A large literature of cooperative game theory is based on the assumptions that the game is expressed...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where ...
We argue that a new solution concept by Huang and Sjöström (2002), called the r-core, extends the co...
We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form...
We consider partition function games and introduce new defini-tions of the core that include the eff...
Abstract. We consider partition function games and introduce new defini-tions of the core that inclu...
We generalise the coalition structure core to games in partition function form. In our definition we...
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N ...
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition struct...
We study solution concepts for NTU games, where the cooperation (or negotiation) of the players can ...
The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhi...
This paper introduces a core concept, called the γ-core, in the primitive framework of a strategic g...
A solution concept for cooperative games, the extended core, is introduced. This concept is always n...
International audienceIn cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its p...
A large literature of cooperative game theory is based on the assumptions that the game is expressed...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...