Add to ORKGcahier de recherche n° 2010-10 E2This paper examines the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. We investigate the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with concentrated voting rights structures. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder's concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. With higher levels of bidder entrenchment, the valuation of a takeover target increasingly reflects the private benefits of control which bidders seek to extract from a dea
This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The eviden...
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the performance of large, medium-sized, and small corpor...
The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the relationship between several factors reporte...
cahier de recherche n° 2010-10 E2This paper examines the incentives of controlling shareholders in t...
We construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal provisions and empirica...
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern thei...
The typical French listed company exhibits a concentrated ownership structure with the largest share...
We construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal provisions and empirica...
For the 5th takeover wave, European M&As were expected to create significant takeover value: the ann...
Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholder...
This thesis provides new evidence that market power is a motivation for takeovers. I develop a proxy...
Takeover regulation is fundamental to the efficient workings of the market for corporate control sin...
Ownership structure: does it matter in takeovers? That has been the central focus of this thesis. Gr...
In this paper, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of large (intra)European takeover bids. We f...
Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholder...
This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The eviden...
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the performance of large, medium-sized, and small corpor...
The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the relationship between several factors reporte...
cahier de recherche n° 2010-10 E2This paper examines the incentives of controlling shareholders in t...
We construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal provisions and empirica...
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern thei...
The typical French listed company exhibits a concentrated ownership structure with the largest share...
We construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal provisions and empirica...
For the 5th takeover wave, European M&As were expected to create significant takeover value: the ann...
Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholder...
This thesis provides new evidence that market power is a motivation for takeovers. I develop a proxy...
Takeover regulation is fundamental to the efficient workings of the market for corporate control sin...
Ownership structure: does it matter in takeovers? That has been the central focus of this thesis. Gr...
In this paper, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of large (intra)European takeover bids. We f...
Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholder...
This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The eviden...
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the performance of large, medium-sized, and small corpor...
The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the relationship between several factors reporte...