The current price of a depletable resource depends on future demands and supplies, which affect how rapidly the resource is exhausted. Plans for future levels of demand and supply can therefore affect the current price. If agents have market power and can commit to future plans, then such plans may be dynamically inconsistent, in that given an opportunity to revise those plans at some later date, they wish to deviate from the initial announcement. We survey cases in which such plans are dynamically inconsistent and discuss solution concepts such as Markov perfect equilibria, time consistent equilibria and feedback forms of open-loop equilibria. Different issues arise depending whether market power is on the supply side, or on the demand sid...
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelbe...
We consider a dynamic model of non-renewable resource extraction under the assumption that players d...
In this paper the binding-contracte open-loop v~n Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vereus-fring...
The aim of this paper is to describe intertemporal optimal policies for a (competitive and monopolis...
We consider a Hicksian, two-period economy with an exhaustible resource. There is no forward resourc...
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical model that can account for price fluctuations in d...
We analyze strategic \u85rm behavior in settings where the production stage is followed by several p...
We consider a Hicksian, two-period economy with an exhaustible resource. There is no forward resourc...
The subject of this thesis is the depletion of scarce resources. The main question to be answered is...
We analyze strategic \u85rm behavior in settings where the production stage is followed by several p...
The validity of the Hotelling's rule, the fundamental theorem of nonrenewable resource economics, is...
The subject of this thesis is the depletion of scarce resources. The main question to be answered is...
We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a sub...
This paper presents an intertemporal general equilibrium model with rationing in the product market,...
The exhaustible-resource monopsony problem provides a basis for understand-ing the dynamic relations...
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelbe...
We consider a dynamic model of non-renewable resource extraction under the assumption that players d...
In this paper the binding-contracte open-loop v~n Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vereus-fring...
The aim of this paper is to describe intertemporal optimal policies for a (competitive and monopolis...
We consider a Hicksian, two-period economy with an exhaustible resource. There is no forward resourc...
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical model that can account for price fluctuations in d...
We analyze strategic \u85rm behavior in settings where the production stage is followed by several p...
We consider a Hicksian, two-period economy with an exhaustible resource. There is no forward resourc...
The subject of this thesis is the depletion of scarce resources. The main question to be answered is...
We analyze strategic \u85rm behavior in settings where the production stage is followed by several p...
The validity of the Hotelling's rule, the fundamental theorem of nonrenewable resource economics, is...
The subject of this thesis is the depletion of scarce resources. The main question to be answered is...
We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a sub...
This paper presents an intertemporal general equilibrium model with rationing in the product market,...
The exhaustible-resource monopsony problem provides a basis for understand-ing the dynamic relations...
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelbe...
We consider a dynamic model of non-renewable resource extraction under the assumption that players d...
In this paper the binding-contracte open-loop v~n Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vereus-fring...