When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable to specify all the possible relevant contingencies, and so contracts are typically incomplete. This paper considers the extent to which these gaps might be filled by building into the contract a mechanism for revising the terms of trade. One striking conclusion of the analysis is that because the parties can rescind the original contract and negotiate a new one, severe limitations are placed on the form the revisions can take. Moreover, these limitations depend crucially on what kind of communication mechanism the parties have at their disposal during revision.Bargaining; Incomplete Contracts; Renegotiation
* This paper was written during a stay at the Fiscal Aairs Department of the International Monetary ...
This paper studies moral hazard contracts that may be renegotiated after an agent chooses an unobser...
Existing theories typically focus on asymmetric information to explain de-lays in bargaining. This i...
It has been emphasized that when contracts are incomplete (e.g., because some relevant variables are...
The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form of contracts and ...
Much real-world contracting involves adding finding new clauses to add to a basic agree-ment, clause...
The theory of incomplete contracts has been much developed over the last few years, but it has faile...
International audienceh e incomplete contract theory sets all the models analyzing the causes and th...
The incomplete contract theory sets all the models analyzing the causes and the consequences of cont...
The models within the theory of contracts can be divided into several sub-categories taking into con...
This introduction introduces three articles in a Symposium by Richard Craswell, Avery Katz, Robert S...
International audienceThis chapter reflects the double-sided view of the economic literature on cont...
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncert...
In this paper we examine the strategic value of flexibility in a world with incomplete contracting. ...
Contract law abhors incompleteness. Although no contract can be entirely complete, the idea of a pur...
* This paper was written during a stay at the Fiscal Aairs Department of the International Monetary ...
This paper studies moral hazard contracts that may be renegotiated after an agent chooses an unobser...
Existing theories typically focus on asymmetric information to explain de-lays in bargaining. This i...
It has been emphasized that when contracts are incomplete (e.g., because some relevant variables are...
The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form of contracts and ...
Much real-world contracting involves adding finding new clauses to add to a basic agree-ment, clause...
The theory of incomplete contracts has been much developed over the last few years, but it has faile...
International audienceh e incomplete contract theory sets all the models analyzing the causes and th...
The incomplete contract theory sets all the models analyzing the causes and the consequences of cont...
The models within the theory of contracts can be divided into several sub-categories taking into con...
This introduction introduces three articles in a Symposium by Richard Craswell, Avery Katz, Robert S...
International audienceThis chapter reflects the double-sided view of the economic literature on cont...
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncert...
In this paper we examine the strategic value of flexibility in a world with incomplete contracting. ...
Contract law abhors incompleteness. Although no contract can be entirely complete, the idea of a pur...
* This paper was written during a stay at the Fiscal Aairs Department of the International Monetary ...
This paper studies moral hazard contracts that may be renegotiated after an agent chooses an unobser...
Existing theories typically focus on asymmetric information to explain de-lays in bargaining. This i...