International audienceWe present and axiomatize several update rules for probabilities (and preferences) where there is no unique additive prior. In the context of non-additive probabilities we define and axiomatize Bayesian update rules; in the context of multiple (additive) priors we define maximum likelihood rules. It turns out that for decision makers which can be described by both theories, the two approaches coincide. Thus, we suggest a pseudo-Bastion foundation to classical statistics, which may also motivate alternative statistical inference techniques, and provide an axiomatically-based ambiguous belies update rule, which is needed for their application in many economic theory models
International audienceWe present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use ...
International audienceWe present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use ...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of Bayesian updating, viewed as a mapping from prior belief...
International audienceWe present and axiomatize several update rules for probabilities (and preferen...
When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule t...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We pr...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upo...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upo...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We pr...
We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making un...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upo...
Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modelled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations...
In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to re...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a uni\u85ed framework: Bayesian revision u...
We interpret the problem of updating beliefs as a choice problem (selecting a posterior from a set o...
International audienceWe present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use ...
International audienceWe present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use ...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of Bayesian updating, viewed as a mapping from prior belief...
International audienceWe present and axiomatize several update rules for probabilities (and preferen...
When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule t...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We pr...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upo...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upo...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We pr...
We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making un...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upo...
Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modelled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations...
In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to re...
This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a uni\u85ed framework: Bayesian revision u...
We interpret the problem of updating beliefs as a choice problem (selecting a posterior from a set o...
International audienceWe present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use ...
International audienceWe present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use ...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of Bayesian updating, viewed as a mapping from prior belief...