Add to ORKGInternational audience1. Introduction. 2. Is Tarski's theory of truth, as Popper claims after Tarski himself, a rehabilitation of the traditional view of truth as correspondence to facts? -- Yes, but not for the reasons he gives. 3. Is Tarski's explicit definition of truth (when it is possible), as Popper claims after Tarski himself, purely morphological (syntactical)? -- No. 4. Is Tarski's theory, as Tarski claims it to be, " epistomologically neutral " ? -- This thesis is ambiguous, and Tarski can support it just as Popper can dispute it as well. 5. Is Popper right for all that when he goes as far as to claim that Tarski's theory of truth provides an argument in favour of " metaphysical realism " -- No. 6. Conclusions