Add to ORKGProfit-maximizing owners of firms may find it optimal to provide managers with incentives to maximize sales in addition to profits. This influences the outcome of the bargaining game between workers and managers over workers' wages and helps to solve the problem of underinvestment by workers in specific human capital. Iinvestigate optimal managerial contracts from this point of view and show that the optimal contract is a function of sales in addition to profits.
The paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in ...
Constrained joint-profit-maximizing retail contracts are derived when the dealer is privately inform...
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering w...
The optimal management contract is derived in an environment in which a manager can influence the di...
This paper studies optimal managerial contracts applying both complete and incomplete contracting ap...
This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequ...
This article shows that contracts which make workers' wages depend on their seniority level as well ...
We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take not only product market but also takeo...
In this paper we examine the problem of inducing a manager to acquire information which is useful in...
In Holmstrom (1982) an example is given, which shows that a manager's concern for the value of his h...
This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Jud...
The authors consider the moral hazard in managers undersupplying imperfectly-marketable, firm-specif...
This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd...
The increasing competition in the labor market for human capital pushes firms to create better incen...
This paper analyses the optimal wage contract when firms face demand uncertainty and workers care ab...
The paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in ...
Constrained joint-profit-maximizing retail contracts are derived when the dealer is privately inform...
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering w...
The optimal management contract is derived in an environment in which a manager can influence the di...
This paper studies optimal managerial contracts applying both complete and incomplete contracting ap...
This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequ...
This article shows that contracts which make workers' wages depend on their seniority level as well ...
We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take not only product market but also takeo...
In this paper we examine the problem of inducing a manager to acquire information which is useful in...
In Holmstrom (1982) an example is given, which shows that a manager's concern for the value of his h...
This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Jud...
The authors consider the moral hazard in managers undersupplying imperfectly-marketable, firm-specif...
This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd...
The increasing competition in the labor market for human capital pushes firms to create better incen...
This paper analyses the optimal wage contract when firms face demand uncertainty and workers care ab...
The paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in ...
Constrained joint-profit-maximizing retail contracts are derived when the dealer is privately inform...
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering w...