In this article the value of communications structures is considered in an agency model with differential information. The optimal compensation to the agent is characterized, and it is shown that this characterization is related to the accountant's use of the budget as a motivation device. Within our framework, we discuss the relationship between the content of information systems supplied to the agent privately and the agency's well-being. It is shown that the agency is not always better off if the agent is supplied with more information, since he might use that information to shirk.
Abstract Communication and no-communication versions of a two-stage principal-agent model are compar...
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different commu...
When should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about...
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the communication model to a situation where the agent...
This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other pub- lic actors, between provid...
This research concerns a previously unexplored area in the study of agency theory--the effects of pr...
Anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to ...
Background and problem: The purpose of financial reporting is to supply information to users of the ...
I show that the principal and the agent may each prefer that the principal or the agent has imperfec...
Abstract: Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multi-period agency model. One ...
This paper compares the principal's payoff in agency models under different assumptions about the ag...
Agency theory analyses the effects of contractual behaviour between two parties: principal(s) and ag...
Agency models have been formulated to examine the relationship that develops when an agent is engage...
This paper studies the joint determination of optimal contracts and equilibrium asset prices in an e...
The three chapters of this dissertation explore the value of information in a variety of settings. I...
Abstract Communication and no-communication versions of a two-stage principal-agent model are compar...
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different commu...
When should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about...
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the communication model to a situation where the agent...
This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other pub- lic actors, between provid...
This research concerns a previously unexplored area in the study of agency theory--the effects of pr...
Anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to ...
Background and problem: The purpose of financial reporting is to supply information to users of the ...
I show that the principal and the agent may each prefer that the principal or the agent has imperfec...
Abstract: Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multi-period agency model. One ...
This paper compares the principal's payoff in agency models under different assumptions about the ag...
Agency theory analyses the effects of contractual behaviour between two parties: principal(s) and ag...
Agency models have been formulated to examine the relationship that develops when an agent is engage...
This paper studies the joint determination of optimal contracts and equilibrium asset prices in an e...
The three chapters of this dissertation explore the value of information in a variety of settings. I...
Abstract Communication and no-communication versions of a two-stage principal-agent model are compar...
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different commu...
When should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about...