We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. We define two periods of time. In the first period, agents buy the platform services on each side and in the second period of time, they can possibly enhance their satisfaction by going to the other face of the platform. We analyze the link between mobility, consumer’s utility, prices and profit. We show that mobility is a valuable feature which can be compared with an increase of product quality. Finally, the firm is able to capture the mobility in its monopoly’s profit. The relative size of each group then appears as a strategical variable for the firm
We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product ...
In the context of platform competition in a two-sided market, we study how exante uncertainty and ex...
In this paper, we propose a novel modelling framework to reproduce the market entry strategies for t...
We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. W...
We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. W...
In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact...
We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buye...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buye...
Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit fr...
This paper examines a monopoly platform’s two-sided pricing strategy through modeling the trades bet...
This paper examines a monopoly platform’s strategy in offering subsidies based on a microfoundation ...
There are many examples of markets involving two groups of agents who need to interact via platforms...
Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industri...
We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product ...
In the context of platform competition in a two-sided market, we study how exante uncertainty and ex...
In this paper, we propose a novel modelling framework to reproduce the market entry strategies for t...
We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. W...
We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. W...
In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact...
We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buye...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buye...
Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit fr...
This paper examines a monopoly platform’s two-sided pricing strategy through modeling the trades bet...
This paper examines a monopoly platform’s strategy in offering subsidies based on a microfoundation ...
There are many examples of markets involving two groups of agents who need to interact via platforms...
Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industri...
We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product ...
In the context of platform competition in a two-sided market, we study how exante uncertainty and ex...
In this paper, we propose a novel modelling framework to reproduce the market entry strategies for t...