Two countries produce goods and are penalized by the common pollution they generate. Each country maximizes an inter-temporal utility criterion, taking account of the pollution stock to which both contribute. The dynamic is in continuous time with possible sudden switches to less polluting technologies. The set of Nash equilibria, for which solutions also remain in the set of constraints, is the intersection of two manifolds in a certain state space. At the Nash equilibrium, the choices of the two countries are interdependent: different productivity levels after switching lead the more productive country to hasten and the less productive to delay the switch. In the absence of cooperation, efforts by one country to pollute less motivate the ...
This paper describes a world composed of two (groups of) countries, which derive their utility from ...
The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, poll...
REDUCE POLLUTION? We develop a North-South model of foreign aid and cross-border pollution resulting...
Working paper en ligne 〈halshs-01341983〉International audienceTwo countries produce goods and are pe...
Ce working paper fait l'objet d'une publication in Pure and Applied Functional Analysis (online jour...
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental benefits using a two-stage optimal control s...
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental indicators using a two-stage optimal control...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
We use two stage optimal control techniques to solve some adoption problems. We first consider the c...
This paper investigates how current and future generations are affected by commitment-based Nash equ...
We formulate and study a nonlinear game of n symmetric countries that produce, pollute, and spend pa...
We analyze a transboundary pollution control problem in a heterogeneous two-country differential gam...
A differential game is the natural framework of analysis for many problems in environmental economic...
It is likely that the decentralized structure at the level of nations of decision-making processes ...
This paper describes a world composed of two (groups of) countries, which derive their utility from ...
The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, poll...
REDUCE POLLUTION? We develop a North-South model of foreign aid and cross-border pollution resulting...
Working paper en ligne 〈halshs-01341983〉International audienceTwo countries produce goods and are pe...
Ce working paper fait l'objet d'une publication in Pure and Applied Functional Analysis (online jour...
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental benefits using a two-stage optimal control s...
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental indicators using a two-stage optimal control...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
We use two stage optimal control techniques to solve some adoption problems. We first consider the c...
This paper investigates how current and future generations are affected by commitment-based Nash equ...
We formulate and study a nonlinear game of n symmetric countries that produce, pollute, and spend pa...
We analyze a transboundary pollution control problem in a heterogeneous two-country differential gam...
A differential game is the natural framework of analysis for many problems in environmental economic...
It is likely that the decentralized structure at the level of nations of decision-making processes ...
This paper describes a world composed of two (groups of) countries, which derive their utility from ...
The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, poll...
REDUCE POLLUTION? We develop a North-South model of foreign aid and cross-border pollution resulting...