[[alternative]]An Economic Analysis of the Revenue Division in the Taiwanese Mobile Phone market

[[abstract]] 目前一般對於資費歸屬的收費方式大致上分為發話端收費（CPP）與雙向收費（RPP）兩種，一般認為在採用發話端收費制度的收費方式，會有行動電話受信服務競爭壓力不足的問題，進而容易造成固網撥行動的受信費偏高。而在雙向收費制度下時並不會有上述這些問題，但在雙向收費制度下卻有電信普及率較低的問題。另外，由文獻中得知在任何一種的電信收費制度下皆可能會存有雙重加價的問題，且若真有雙重加價問題的存在則將會對收費制度產生不良的影響，例如通信費會因此而收取較高的費用。本文將延續Doyle and Smith（1998）的研究去分析台灣的資費歸屬問題，藉由著衡量兩種不同的收費方式的社會福利，比較在不同的收費制度下何者為較適於台灣。本次研究初步在經由模型的推論下，得知對於台灣的資費歸屬問題而言發話端收費（CPP）和雙向收費制（RPP）兩種制度的福利效果並無差異，但在促進行動網路與固網業務之發展等因素考量下，本文認為發話端收費制是較合適於台灣的收費制度。[[abstract]] In the literature most researchers divide the revenue division principle in cross-network calls into two systems-“calling party pays” (CPP) and “receiving party pays” (RPP). The CPP pricing system has insufficient competitive constraints on mobile termination charges, thus the charges may be well above cost. Although the markup up rate of RPP is less than the amounts charged by CPP, it will lower mobile penetration rate. Both pricing systems may exist the double marginalization problem in the sense that it causes higher mobile termination charges. This paper analyzes the revenue division problem in Taiwan by revising the work of Doyle and Smith (1998) to measure the social welfares for two alternative pricing systems. This result shows that CPP or RPP have the same welfare implication in Taiwan and we suggest that CPP is a better pricing system to develop of the mobile network and fixed network in Taiwan since it generates a higher rate of market penetration