[[alternative]]Different Roles' viewpoint and interaction in Environmental Dispute--A Case Study from Lin-neiIncinerator Dispute

[[abstract]] 在台灣，有關廢棄物處理設施選址的地方性衝突時有耳聞，而衝突所導致的結果，往往造成巨大的社會成本損失，因此本文從政策設計者（中央政府）與社區居民兩種不同立場為出發點，分析衝突的原因。一般說來，中央政府負責政策設計，主要是以全國性的考量為主，故對於地方之需求往往無法兼顧。本文嘗試以最適社會福利之模式，去分析政策設計者與地方社區居民對於垃圾處理服務量與污染排放的差異，並藉由敏感分析去探討相關因素的影響，同時糾紛之中各方角力介入的情形不同，也造成了不同程度的環境衝突以及社會的損失，因此本文以近期發生的雲林縣林內焚化爐衝突事件為個案進行研究，依Bryant（1996, 1998）所發展的方法論，確認糾紛中第一線的參與者，再以Bredariol (2003)之模式，將糾紛參與者分為支持、反對、主管機關等四種角色，並由學者所定義之利害關係者，一併進行深度訪談，期望可以透過第一線的糾紛參與者以及利害相關者的訪談，從中找出糾紛形成前的潛在影響者及建構其權力關係模式。本研究發現，政策設計者所考慮的最適垃圾處理服務量Q 與最適污染濃度e ，相較於社區居民所需的最適值 與 ，政策設計者立場的最適值要比社區居民之最適值為大，其有可能是衝突產生的原因之一，同時此一結果也可以為衝突作一註解，而本研究發現，政黨的支持對於糾紛解決扮演著潛在影響的角色，若能在政策制訂前，透過不同政黨的參與以及協商，將可降低政策執行時的衝突並作為消除政策設計者與社區居民認知歧異的出發點。[[abstract]] The environmental dispute among stakeholders on the siting problem of notorious facilities for waste treatments took place very often in the past, and as a consequence these conflicts leads to environmental disputes which caused high lose in social costs. In general, a policy planner (central government) considers all the stakeholder’s (regions) interests and determines the social optimality by maximizing the social welfares constituting of all theses regions. In contrast, local residents care about only the interests relating with the local community itself. We present a mathematical model to analyze the policy gap between the policy planner and the local residents. On the side, we employ the method of case studies to analyze the environmental dispute. The case of environmental disputes on the project of Lin-Nei incinerator construction is examined. The major purpose is to investigate the role and power relationship of the players in the dispute. At first, we based on content analysis and the methodology by Bryant（1996, 1998）to identify the players in this dispute and to classify four roles by Bredariol (2003). Through a series of in-depth interview with the players in the dispute and the stakeholders in the conflict, we analyze factors to affect the formation of the dispute and to examine the power relationship among each players and related stakeholders. The results of our analysis find that the optimal waste disposal capacity and pollution emission for the policy planner (Q* , e* ) is greater than local residents demand ( q#, e# ). We suggest that the policy gap maybe the cause of environmental conflicts and political party is a potential factors in the dispute. The results of the analysis can serve as a guideline for the policy planner to incorporate the stakeholder’s perspectives in formulating environmental policies and may provide valuable information for a policy planner to avoid the emergence of environmental disputes before policy setting