[[alternative]]THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDEND POLICY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

[[abstract]] 本研究旨在研究股利政策是否為經理人進行盈餘管理的誘因之一，尤其當公司未操縱前盈餘低於支付目標股利之目標盈餘時，經理人員可能使用各種可操縱盈餘的方法，使盈餘增加，以達到目標盈餘。 本研究以民國82年至91年有發放股利的台灣上市公司為研究樣本，使用Modified Jones Model來估計裁決性應計項目，並以裁決性應計項目為應變數，以股利政策之替代變數為自變數，並加入董監事持股比例、公司規模及負債比率為控制變數，進行複迴歸分析，探討股利政策對公司裁決性應計項目的影響。第二部分，本文將樣本分為操縱組與對照組。前者是指未操縱前盈餘較目標盈餘低的公司；後者則為未操縱前盈餘已達目標盈餘的公司。然後，以t檢定及無母數檢定來探討操縱組公司相對於與對照組而言，是否顯著差異。 實證結果發現，預期盈餘管理與盈餘分派股利率(股利政策之替代變數)與裁決性應計項目呈現正相關，且達顯著水準，顯示公司之股利政策為影響管理當局是否進行盈餘管理的因素之一，故支持本研究之假說一及假說二。而在操縱工具方面，電子產業與非電子產業未操縱前盈餘低於目標盈餘的公司(操縱組)相對於未操縱前盈餘已達目標盈餘的公司(對照組)，均會使用較多之裁決性應計項目來操縱盈餘。其中以裁決性應收帳款、裁決性存貨、裁決性應付帳款及異常營業外損益較為顯著。此外，電子產業之異常處分資產損益及可操縱之研發支出亦呈顯著值，而非電子產業則未達顯著值。故本研究之實證結果支持經理人會利用盈餘管理，使盈餘增加以達支付目標股利之目標盈餘之假說，即股利政策為影響盈餘管理的因素之一。 [[abstract]] The purpose of this research is to investigate whether dividend policy would be one of the motivations for earnings manipulation. Specifically, if the unmanipulated earnings fall short of the target earnings, whether it is possible that the management may manipulate earnings upward toward the target earnings to avoid stock price drop. The empirical results indicate that the predicted earnings management based on dividends is positively related to the discretionary accruals, which confirms dividend policy is one of the motivations for earnings manipulation. As manipulation tools are concrened, we find the management in electric and nonelectric industries mainly uses more discretionary accrual items to manipulate earnings, especially the discretionary accounts receivable, discretionary inventory, discretionary account payable, and non-operating income. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence of this study supports the hypothesis that management may manipulate earnings upward to accomplish targeted earnings, and dividend policy would be one of the motivations for earnings manipulation.