Daniel Dennett introduced the term 'sub-personal' into philosophers' vocabulary thirty years ago. Dennett's uses of 'sub-personal' are of interest in connection with the development both of his own views and of the subject of philosophy of mind in the recent past. I have a particular reason for focusing on Dennett: his original distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of explanation is lost sight of in much recent work, with the result that a position that I should want to defend is lost sight of too. I shall present an argument designed to show that a satisfactory philosophy of mind must respect the distinction Dennett first made, and that this distinction is widely ignored nowadays. Even Dennett has deserted it, so that the po...
The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much de...
Dennett argues that the decentralized view of human cognitive organization finding increasing suppor...
Are zombies possible? They’re not just possible, they’re actual. We’re all zombies. (Dennett Consci...
Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub‐personal levels of explan...
Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establ...
It is a commonplace assumption throughout contemporary philosophy of mind that there is a distinctio...
In the mid 80s Daniel Dennett has published a series of articles on the problem of the self. His sug...
Dennett depicts human minds as both deeply different from, yet profoundly continuous with, the minds...
A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. De...
This paper deals with Daniel Dennett’s well-known charges against phenomenological philosophy as an ...
This paper compares Spinoza with Daniel Dennett and uncovers a number of striking parallels. Lloyd’s...
Although D. Dennett is sometimes accused of insensitivity to 'real', first-person problems of the mi...
In this essay, it is argued that naturalism of an even moderate sort speaks strongly against a certa...
This article presents a critical assesment of Dennett’s narrative self theory as a personal identity...
Over the past thirty years, Daniel Clement Dennett has had a major influence on our understanding of...
The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much de...
Dennett argues that the decentralized view of human cognitive organization finding increasing suppor...
Are zombies possible? They’re not just possible, they’re actual. We’re all zombies. (Dennett Consci...
Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub‐personal levels of explan...
Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establ...
It is a commonplace assumption throughout contemporary philosophy of mind that there is a distinctio...
In the mid 80s Daniel Dennett has published a series of articles on the problem of the self. His sug...
Dennett depicts human minds as both deeply different from, yet profoundly continuous with, the minds...
A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. De...
This paper deals with Daniel Dennett’s well-known charges against phenomenological philosophy as an ...
This paper compares Spinoza with Daniel Dennett and uncovers a number of striking parallels. Lloyd’s...
Although D. Dennett is sometimes accused of insensitivity to 'real', first-person problems of the mi...
In this essay, it is argued that naturalism of an even moderate sort speaks strongly against a certa...
This article presents a critical assesment of Dennett’s narrative self theory as a personal identity...
Over the past thirty years, Daniel Clement Dennett has had a major influence on our understanding of...
The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much de...
Dennett argues that the decentralized view of human cognitive organization finding increasing suppor...
Are zombies possible? They’re not just possible, they’re actual. We’re all zombies. (Dennett Consci...