Add to ORKGThis paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters voting sincerly or strategically. Different ways of generating random preference profiles are introduced: Rousseauist cultures are suitable for common interest project assessment; Impartial cultures are standard in Social Choice Theory; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean ones are standard in Political Science.Social Choice. Voting Rules. Impartial Culture. Condorcet. Borda
Abstract. The study of voting systems often takes place in the theoretical do-main due to a lack of ...
In this paper an attempt has been taken to describe various types of voting system and manipulation ...
We study coalitional manipulation of voting systems: can a subset of voters, by voting strategically...
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Co...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
In this paper, we argue that computer simulations can provide valuable insights into the performance...
<p>For at least two thousand years, voting has been used as one of the most effective ways to aggreg...
If individual voters observe the true ranking on a set of alternatives with error, then the social c...
The first part of this Thesis asks whether we can devise voting rules that allow strategic voters to...
abstract: Borda's social choice method and Condorcet's social choice method are shown to satisfy dif...
Preference aggregation is a topic of study in different fields such as philosophy, mathematics, econ...
WP 2006-22 October 2006JEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41Recent papers show that in g...
Voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference orders have been recently proposed, l...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Abstract. The study of voting systems often takes place in the theoretical do-main due to a lack of ...
In this paper an attempt has been taken to describe various types of voting system and manipulation ...
We study coalitional manipulation of voting systems: can a subset of voters, by voting strategically...
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Co...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
In this paper, we argue that computer simulations can provide valuable insights into the performance...
<p>For at least two thousand years, voting has been used as one of the most effective ways to aggreg...
If individual voters observe the true ranking on a set of alternatives with error, then the social c...
The first part of this Thesis asks whether we can devise voting rules that allow strategic voters to...
abstract: Borda's social choice method and Condorcet's social choice method are shown to satisfy dif...
Preference aggregation is a topic of study in different fields such as philosophy, mathematics, econ...
WP 2006-22 October 2006JEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41Recent papers show that in g...
Voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference orders have been recently proposed, l...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Abstract. The study of voting systems often takes place in the theoretical do-main due to a lack of ...
In this paper an attempt has been taken to describe various types of voting system and manipulation ...
We study coalitional manipulation of voting systems: can a subset of voters, by voting strategically...