Corporate law scholarship has focused on the role of the states as competitive actors in producing corporate law. The standard story is that states compete to provide corporate law options for businesses, producing a race to the top or a race to the bottom in which corporate law is created by market rather than political processes. This story is deeply implausible: Though states are constrained, they are far from powerless. There can be no escape from politics in determining law
Delaware rose to preeminence in the incorporation market after a key point of inflection for corpora...
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as a distinct phenomenon. Under the tr...
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate go...
Unlike ordinary human citizens, corporations may choose the law that governs their most fundamental ...
Delaware has a population less than one-third of one percent of the nation, but it is the state of i...
Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, politi...
From the classic Cary-Winter debate to current legal scholarship, commentators have struggled to exp...
A perennial issue in corporate law reform is the desirability of a federal system. For notwithstandi...
For decades, American legal scholars have debated over the implications of allowing corporations to ...
Commentators sometimes recognize Delaware\u27s preeminence in corporate law, but they almost invaria...
Berle and Means’s view that managers rather than shareholders control our largest corporations finds...
Commentators have long debated whether competition among states for corporate charters represents a ...
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my rec...
This Article argues that the key to understanding the complex regulatory environment in which the mo...
Corporate law does not conform to ordinary democratic norms: unlike human citizens, corporations may...
Delaware rose to preeminence in the incorporation market after a key point of inflection for corpora...
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as a distinct phenomenon. Under the tr...
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate go...
Unlike ordinary human citizens, corporations may choose the law that governs their most fundamental ...
Delaware has a population less than one-third of one percent of the nation, but it is the state of i...
Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, politi...
From the classic Cary-Winter debate to current legal scholarship, commentators have struggled to exp...
A perennial issue in corporate law reform is the desirability of a federal system. For notwithstandi...
For decades, American legal scholars have debated over the implications of allowing corporations to ...
Commentators sometimes recognize Delaware\u27s preeminence in corporate law, but they almost invaria...
Berle and Means’s view that managers rather than shareholders control our largest corporations finds...
Commentators have long debated whether competition among states for corporate charters represents a ...
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my rec...
This Article argues that the key to understanding the complex regulatory environment in which the mo...
Corporate law does not conform to ordinary democratic norms: unlike human citizens, corporations may...
Delaware rose to preeminence in the incorporation market after a key point of inflection for corpora...
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as a distinct phenomenon. Under the tr...
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate go...