Add to ORKGThe basic issue in this exchange is whether Professors Gould and Yamey have materially weakened the case I made for the legality of resale price maintenance (r.p.m.) desired by a manufacturer who is not in collusion with other manufacturers. I believe they have not. In this response I will try to demonstrate that their Rejoinder\u27s strictures on welfare economics are irrelevant, its price theory mistaken, and its demands for certainty one-sided and unreasonable
Over recent years, there have been important divergences in thinking among economists and lawyers ab...
Writing 35 years ago in The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork observed, “Antitrust policy cannot be mad...
A natural consequence of employer restraints of trade that decrease wages is lower prices. Under ant...
The basic issue in this exchange is whether Professors Gould and Yamey have materially weakened the ...
In replying to Professor Gould and Professor Yamey, I must necessarily assume that the reader is gen...
United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promot...
Whether antitrust policy should pursue a goal of general welfare or consumer welfare has been de...
The dominant view of antitrust policy in the United States is that it is intended to promote some ve...
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which r...
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle stands for the proposition that antitrust policy should encou...
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the ...
In this paper, we discuss the problem of the rule of reason and the welfare standard in antitrust. W...
Resale price maintenance is a particularly dangerous vertical intrabrand restraint. Because of its d...
There has been considerable debate concerning whether consumer surplus or total surplus should be th...
Instances in which purchasers collude to depress price raise complex enforcement issues if one adher...
Over recent years, there have been important divergences in thinking among economists and lawyers ab...
Writing 35 years ago in The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork observed, “Antitrust policy cannot be mad...
A natural consequence of employer restraints of trade that decrease wages is lower prices. Under ant...
The basic issue in this exchange is whether Professors Gould and Yamey have materially weakened the ...
In replying to Professor Gould and Professor Yamey, I must necessarily assume that the reader is gen...
United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promot...
Whether antitrust policy should pursue a goal of general welfare or consumer welfare has been de...
The dominant view of antitrust policy in the United States is that it is intended to promote some ve...
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which r...
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle stands for the proposition that antitrust policy should encou...
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the ...
In this paper, we discuss the problem of the rule of reason and the welfare standard in antitrust. W...
Resale price maintenance is a particularly dangerous vertical intrabrand restraint. Because of its d...
There has been considerable debate concerning whether consumer surplus or total surplus should be th...
Instances in which purchasers collude to depress price raise complex enforcement issues if one adher...
Over recent years, there have been important divergences in thinking among economists and lawyers ab...
Writing 35 years ago in The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork observed, “Antitrust policy cannot be mad...
A natural consequence of employer restraints of trade that decrease wages is lower prices. Under ant...