In these remarks I shall take issue with the theme sounded byseveral other scholars in this Symposium-that there is an essentialunity to the interpretive work of law and literature. Indeed, I shalltake issue with one of the principal premises of the Symposiumitself-that law is one of the liberal arts
Does the fact that the Constitution is law tell us anything about the proper method of interpreting ...
Academic and political debates about what texts are canonical in the liberal arts have been occurrin...
Part of a symposium on "the Constitution as hard law" at a meeting of the Association of American La...
In these remarks I shall take issue with the theme sounded byseveral other scholars in this Symposiu...
Part of a symposium on "the Constitution as hard law" at a meeting of the Association of American L...
The significance of the most important legal act-the Constitution-to the social medium is evident. T...
Professor Cunningham, in a provocative memorandum, asks how the legal landscape might change if cour...
In this chapter from Law and the Humanities: An Introduction, published by Cambridge University Pr...
The distinction between a concept and its different conceptions plays a prominent role in debates ab...
Part of a symposium on "the Constitution as hard law" at a meeting of the Association of American L...
This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most s...
The study of constitutional law clearly presupposes a theory of interpretation. All too often, howev...
This paper argues that the central object of constitutional interpretation is the Constitution, whic...
For much of its history, the interpretation of the United States Constitution presupposed judges see...
What is the nature of the US Constitution? How ought it to be interpreted? Ronald Dworkin famously a...
Does the fact that the Constitution is law tell us anything about the proper method of interpreting ...
Academic and political debates about what texts are canonical in the liberal arts have been occurrin...
Part of a symposium on "the Constitution as hard law" at a meeting of the Association of American La...
In these remarks I shall take issue with the theme sounded byseveral other scholars in this Symposiu...
Part of a symposium on "the Constitution as hard law" at a meeting of the Association of American L...
The significance of the most important legal act-the Constitution-to the social medium is evident. T...
Professor Cunningham, in a provocative memorandum, asks how the legal landscape might change if cour...
In this chapter from Law and the Humanities: An Introduction, published by Cambridge University Pr...
The distinction between a concept and its different conceptions plays a prominent role in debates ab...
Part of a symposium on "the Constitution as hard law" at a meeting of the Association of American L...
This third volume about legal interpretation focuses on the interpretation of a constitution, most s...
The study of constitutional law clearly presupposes a theory of interpretation. All too often, howev...
This paper argues that the central object of constitutional interpretation is the Constitution, whic...
For much of its history, the interpretation of the United States Constitution presupposed judges see...
What is the nature of the US Constitution? How ought it to be interpreted? Ronald Dworkin famously a...
Does the fact that the Constitution is law tell us anything about the proper method of interpreting ...
Academic and political debates about what texts are canonical in the liberal arts have been occurrin...
Part of a symposium on "the Constitution as hard law" at a meeting of the Association of American La...