Add to ORKGThis paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of our experimental game is characterized by efficient imitation but complete revelation of information is time consuming. In accordance with the equilibrium solution, subjects better informed take investment decision before subjects who are less informed and subjects’ decisions exhibit rational imitation. Still, subjects do not play exactly in accordance with the equilibrium sequence and we interpret their deviations from equilibrium play as an attempt to internalize th...
In clock games, agents receive differently-timed private signals when an asset value is above its fu...
This paper studies how the introduction of social learning with costs to delay affects coordination ...
This paper considers a timing game in which heterogeneously informed agents have the option to delay...
This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete m...
We study a two-player game of strategic experimentation in which agents choose the timing of investm...
We study investment cycles and information flows in a model of social learning in which investment r...
In this paper, we experimentally investigate a social learning model with endogenous timing. Specifi...
We investigate the role of information and endogenous timing of decisions on co-ordination. In a glo...
Many dynamic strategic environments feature players\u27 learning about the fundamentals from both ex...
In a model, two players, heterogeneous in their information quality, compete with each other with pe...
: We develop a model where there are informational externalities and where the agents can choose to ...
In a model, two players, heterogeneous in their information quality, compete with each other with pe...
This paper is an adaptation of the Chamley-Gale endogenous-timing information-revelation model of in...
In an experimental standard Cournot oligopoly we test the importance of models of behaviour characte...
The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements exist...
In clock games, agents receive differently-timed private signals when an asset value is above its fu...
This paper studies how the introduction of social learning with costs to delay affects coordination ...
This paper considers a timing game in which heterogeneously informed agents have the option to delay...
This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete m...
We study a two-player game of strategic experimentation in which agents choose the timing of investm...
We study investment cycles and information flows in a model of social learning in which investment r...
In this paper, we experimentally investigate a social learning model with endogenous timing. Specifi...
We investigate the role of information and endogenous timing of decisions on co-ordination. In a glo...
Many dynamic strategic environments feature players\u27 learning about the fundamentals from both ex...
In a model, two players, heterogeneous in their information quality, compete with each other with pe...
: We develop a model where there are informational externalities and where the agents can choose to ...
In a model, two players, heterogeneous in their information quality, compete with each other with pe...
This paper is an adaptation of the Chamley-Gale endogenous-timing information-revelation model of in...
In an experimental standard Cournot oligopoly we test the importance of models of behaviour characte...
The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements exist...
In clock games, agents receive differently-timed private signals when an asset value is above its fu...
This paper studies how the introduction of social learning with costs to delay affects coordination ...
This paper considers a timing game in which heterogeneously informed agents have the option to delay...