Environmental Product Standards, International Trade and Monopolistic Competition

Thispaper examines the performance of non-cooperative environmentalpolicy in the case of local consumption externalities. In a two-countrymodel with monopolistic competiton, governments simultaneouslyimpose environmental product standards. Stricter regulationsforce the industrial sector to shift resources from non-environmentalto environmental R&D. Since the R&Dallocation in each country depends on the domestic as well asforeign policy, local decisions affect the economic and ecologicalsystem in the other region. Despite the arising spillovers, thepayoff dominant equilibria of the countries' game are efficient.This result requires similar but not identical preferences andtechnologies in both countries. It holds even if the regionsdiffer in market size. Under certain conditions, the non-cooperativesolutions remain efficient in the case of global pollution. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000Environmental policy, product standards, international policy cooperation, intra-industry trade, monopolistic competition,